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8	UNITED STATES DIS	TRICT COURT	
9	FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT YAKIMA		
10		- 	
11	ENRIQUE JEVONS, as managing member of Jevons Properties LLC,	No. 1:20-cv-03182-SAB	
	FREYA K. BURGSTALLER, as trustee	Plaintiffs' Supplemental Reply Brief	
12	of the Freya K. Burgstaller Revocable Trust, JAY GLENN and KENDRA	regarding <i>Cedar Point Nursery</i>	
13	GLENN,		
14	Plaintiffs,		
15	,		
16	VS.		
17	JAY INSLEE, in his official capacity as		
	Governor of the State of Washington and ROBERT FERGUSON, in his		
18	official capacity of the Attorney General		
19	of the State of Washington,		
20	Defendants.		
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23			
	II		

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Pls. Supp. Reply Brief re *Cedar Point Nursery* 1:20-cv-03182-SAB 1

1	INTRODUCTION		
2	This brief is to reply to Defendants' Supplemental brief regarding Cedar		
3	Point Nursery v. Hassim, U.S, 141 S.Ct. 2063 (2021) (ECF 52).		
4	Defendants do not defend on the basis of any exception from the rule that		
5	mandated physical occupations are <i>per se</i> takings addressed in <i>Cedar Point</i>		
6	Nursery and in Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief. ECF 48, at 5-9. Rather,		
7	Defendants' overarching themes are that government may regulate landlord-		
8	tenant relations, that Plaintiffs' properties are open to the public and that		
9	Plaintiffs' invited their tenants to reside in their homes. These themes do not		
10	discount Cedar Point Nursery's impact on Plaintiffs' pending claim.		
11	ARGUMENT		
12	I		
	That government may regulate landlord-tenant relations does not determine whether Defendants mandate a physical occupation of Plaintiffs' property.		
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14			
14 15	whether Defendants mandate a physical occupation of Plaintiffs' property.		
14 15 16	whether Defendants mandate a physical occupation of Plaintiffs' property. Despite the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the importance of the right to		
14151617	whether Defendants mandate a physical occupation of Plaintiffs' property. Despite the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the importance of the right to exclude to the entire bundle of rights that constitutes property, Defendants		
14 15 16 17 18	whether Defendants mandate a physical occupation of Plaintiffs' property. Despite the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the importance of the right to exclude to the entire bundle of rights that constitutes property, Defendants assert that government is free to regulate the economic relations of landlords		
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20	whether Defendants mandate a physical occupation of Plaintiffs' property. Despite the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the importance of the right to exclude to the entire bundle of rights that constitutes property, Defendants assert that government is free to regulate the economic relations of landlords and tenants without causing a taking. ECF 52, at 2. Defendants quote <i>F.C.C. v.</i>		
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	whether Defendants mandate a physical occupation of Plaintiffs' property. Despite the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the importance of the right to exclude to the entire bundle of rights that constitutes property, Defendants assert that government is free to regulate the economic relations of landlords and tenants without causing a taking. ECF 52, at 2. Defendants quote <i>F.C.C. v.</i> Defendants assert that Plaintiffs seek to "stop the now-expired Evictions"		
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	whether Defendants mandate a physical occupation of Plaintiffs' property. Despite the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the importance of the right to exclude to the entire bundle of rights that constitutes property, Defendants assert that government is free to regulate the economic relations of landlords and tenants without causing a taking. ECF 52, at 2. Defendants quote <i>F.C.C. v.</i> Defendants assert that Plaintiffs seek to "stop the now-expired Evictions Moratorium" by arguing that it is a taking for which compensation is required.		

Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245. 252 (1987), as stating "statutes regulating
the economic relations of landlords and tenants are not per se takings." ECF
52, at 3. Additionally, they rely on Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,
528-29 (1992)), for the proposition that "States have broad power to regulate
housing conditions in general and the landlord tenant relationship in particular
without paying compensation for all economic injuries such regulation
entails." ECF 52, at 3. No one here demands compensation for all injuries.
But Florida Power and Yee are both cases challenging regulation of the
price of rent and holding that regulations of rent prices—like numerous prior
price control regulations—did not constitute a <i>per se</i> taking. The fact that
government may regulate the economic relations between landlords and tenants
does not answer the question as to whether a particular regulation—requiring
landlords to house tenants who break their leases or pay no rent with no
prospects of ever recovering the rent—is a <i>per se</i> taking because it is mandating
a physical occupation of property without compliance with conditions upon
which Plaintiffs' invitation to occupy was based. Under Defendants' theory,
because the state may regulate landlord-tenant relations, it could mandate that
Plaintiffs house their nonpaying and lease breaking tenants indefinitely.
It is also important to recognize that the Court in Yee found payment of rent
significant. "On the face of the regulatory scheme, neither the city nor the State
compels petitioners, once they have rented their property to tenants, to continue
doing so." Yee, 503 U.S. at 527-28. The city ordinance did not require the
tenants' continued occupation when there was "nonpayment of rent." <i>Id.</i> at 524.

The present situation is quite different. Defendants mandate that Plaintiffs
continue with the physical occupation of their property by people who pay no
rent whatsoever. Continued physical occupation is mandated. While that result
may be an appropriate response to the Pandemic and the takings clause of Fifth
Amendment does not prohibit the taking of property, it just requires payment of
just compensation so that the burden of meeting this public need is shouldered
by the public and not just those who are providing rental housing. See
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
That government may regulate landlord-tenant relations is not a free pass to
never have to pay compensation when mandating a physical occupation of
property when the right to remain has expired by the terms of the lease or by
violation of lease requirements. After all, government may also regulate the
economic relations between employers and employees, including the right to
unionize, which was the backdrop of Cedar Point Nursery. The power to
regulate does not immunize the government from the requirement to pay just

II Plaintiffs' claim that their property has been taken is not eliminated on the theory that their properties are open to the public.

Defendant's second major point is that *Cedar Point Nursery* involves a business that was not "open to the public," and suggesting that Plaintiffs' properties are. ECF 52, at 4. But *Cedar Park Nursery* explains what is meant by being open to the public by specifically citing Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), cited in Cedar Park Nursery, 141 S.Ct. at 2076. As

compensation when it mandates the continuation of a physical occupation.

1	its name suggests, Prune Yard Shopping Center, involving a shopping center	
2	that was truly open to the public. Anyone could come and go. Plaintiffs' homes	
3	which they rent are not open to the public. Rather, they are private spaces	
4	which tenants have the right to occupy upon meeting conditions of the lease.	
5	Failure to meet the conditions of the lease means that they have no right to	
6	occupy, nor do any other members of the public.	
7	III There is no principled reason for concluding that property is not taken simply because Plaintiffs' originally invited their tenants to occupy.	
8		
9	Defendants' argument mandates that if one ever invited someone on to their	
10	property, there would be no forced physical occupation of that property if the	
11	owner demanded that they leave. Of course, a property owner cannot force	
12	someone to leave in violation of the rights provided in a lease. But Defendants'	
13	"once invited, stay forever" theory is unsupported by logic or the cases they cite.	
14	Conclusion	
15	Defendants' Proclamations appropriate Plaintiffs' property to meet a public	
16	need. The taking of private property interests has occurred.	
17	Respectfully submitted this 29th day of July, 2021,	
18	Stephens & Klinge LLP	
19	<u>/s/ Richard M. Stephens</u> WSBA No. 21776	
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